Volume 11, No 2.

Towards a communicative reform of the United Nations

A critical theory perspective

ann-Christin Raschdorf

Disclaimer: THE OPINION OF THE AUTHOR DOES NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

I. Introduction

All institutional paradigms entail a number of implicit communicative assumptions which ultimately determine and limit an institution’s scope for action (Foucault 1973; Kuhn 1967). The conceptual framework of the United Nations and its agencies presents no exception in this regard. This article attempts to reconstruct some rules and principles that guide and inform action in the field of sustainable peace-building. The hope is to shed some light on present conceptual and participatory shortcomings and to indicate possible new avenues for organisational reform. In this context, this article will in particular explore communicative assumptions that are conceptually linked to a core principle of the UN – the notion of normative neutrality. It will be argued that this principle expresses itself in at least three different ways: a) in ‘neutral’ structural- functional assumptions within the UN discourse on peace-building; b) in ‘neutral’ references to international law; and c) in a preference for ‘neutral’ numeric indicators measuring peace.

a) Many scholars and practitioners maintain that in the light of an irreducible plurality of cultural norms and values and normative uncertainty, peace-building should merely focus on formal institution-building and the meeting of the structural-functional institutional needs of post-conflict societies, which are believed to be invariably neutral and universal. These institutional necessities include the provision of good governance (e.g. civil service reform), democratic elections, rule of law (e.g. legal institution and capacity-building) and sustainable development. However, while each of these processes represents an important function in the rebuilding of a state order, this ‘neutral’ state-based agenda is not necessarily as impartial as it seems. As a result of its macro-systemic focus the above summarised program neglects core normative and communicative challenges at lower levels. For example, this agenda frequently does not account for the normative/perceptual needs of individuals and cultural entities in a post-conflict situation. These needs are often exclusively defined and measured through the individual’s/group’s relationship to the state (e.g. a state’s ability to function and its willingness and ability to protect an individual’s or a group’s inalienable human/collective, social, political and economic rights – outlined by international law).

b) Clearly, there are a number of good reasons for avoiding any involvement in localised ideological debates and relying on standardised and formalised international norms and principles. Some cultural perceptions and needs of individuals and groups can be at times counterproductive (to order) or biased (one-sided) and might also violate rights of others. Nevertheless, what is often forgotten is that these perceptions are also core indicators for what is considered legitimate within a cultural context. Discourses on violence leave core resources for political demagogues and fuel future conflicts if left unaddressed. Other cultural discourses might raise valid concerns which might be systemically overheard or silenced by a particular, newly established, seemingly ‘neutral’ status quo. A transformation or inclusion of these (potentially but not necessarily distorted) ideas on legitimacy requires an active discursive involvement and a temporary immersion of ‘internationals’ in the respective dialogic reality. Clearly, any such dialogic exercise would coerce participants to leave the realm of neutrality insofar as they have to defend their own normative standards. In this context, a line of argument would derive its authority not only from classic formal reference points (e.g. international law) but most importantly through its local communicative and practical value. In such a scenario, success is measured by the degree to which agents of the organisation succeed in truly, rightfully and authentically translating recommendations and international norms into a lived praxis of enforceable rights.

c) So far the success of institutional processes has often only been examined in terms of seemingly neutral, quantitative categories (e.g. numeric outcomes of elections/number of trained lawyers/courts). While these processes are comparatively easy to manage, the downside is that, strictly speaking, they cannot measure cultural legitimacy or normative commitment of citizens within a society.

As will be shown below, as a result of their focus on order, structural functional peace-building models favour political actors who are already in power or support actors who have been not directly involved in ideological/normative conflicts and might not pose a threat to an emerging status quo (e.g. expatriates). While this seems like a viable strategy to immediately assist a failed/post-conflict state in the aftermath of a war, this model loses its usefulness in the long run insofar as it detaches the centre from its normative and cultural base. As a consequence, it fails to engage or reform/transform the latter. Many state-building exercises fail because their original set-up does not allow for a dialogic inclusion of other normative actors, which often ultimately results in a radicalisation of the latter.

The consequences of a systemic exclusion of alternative normative/cultural validity claims and perceptions (through ‘neutral/objective’ quick fixes) has been rarely thought through in all its practical and communicative implications in a UN context. This article will attempt to shed some light on these issues.

With this purpose in mind, it will outline the main differences between the current ‘structural-functional´ model and a transformative model (critical theory-based) approach to peace-building.¹ The argument of this article develops along the following lines. Firstly, it will be argued that the present structural-functional discourse on peace-building fails to capture the full spectrum of peace-building practices insofar as it stresses the necessity of order at the expense of cultural authentic transformative change. This theoretical bias leads to a systemic exclusion of competing normative concerns and actors at lower levels (lack of local ownership of the process). As a result of a communicative exclusion of normative aspects and agents, distorted perceptual discourses (discourses of violence) remain intact on lower levels. These narratives can easily be reactivated for political purposes by sidelined political actors and linked to neglected cultural contents once an international presence is reduced. The often unaddressed task of local ‘perceptual peace-building’ poses various challenges for the UN, which derives its main normative reference point from international law and the principle of strict neutrality. A critical theory-based model of peace-building offers two possible starting points for a successful promotion of perceptual peace in different cultural contexts. It: a) highlights three main areas of perceptual distortions; and b) develops multi-levelled communication processes to remedy them.

II. Structural-functional assumptions within the UN discourse on sustainable peace-building

According to Talcott Parsons (1949), the founding father of structural functionalism, every social system (this includes any kind of organisation, groups of individuals, communities or states) has to fulfil four core functions to ensure its survival. According to his ‘AGIL’ scheme, social systems reproduce themselves through the fulfilment of four core tasks:

* Adaptation: This task is derived from the necessity of a system to acquire/reproduce adequate material resources. This function is fulfilled by the economic subsystem of a social system.

* Goal attainment: This task corresponds to the necessity of goal-setting and implementation. This function is fulfilled by the political subsystem.

* Integration: This task highlights the necessity of maintaining solidarity and coordination among the subunits of the system. This function is fulfilled in all (economic, political, cultural) subsystems and (cultural, personal, behavioural) action systems by the social and legal system. In other words, integration is necessarily a normative function that is safeguarded by normative agents.

* Latency: This task stresses the necessity to create, uphold and transmit the system’s particular cultural norms and values. This educative function is fulfilled by the cultural subsystem.

The abovementioned functions are accomplished by different subsystemic actors: a) in the economic domain, systemic needs for adaptation are met by fiscal bodies/large co-operations; b) in the political domain governments fulfil goal-attainment functions; c) in the social domain, courts/unions/political parties ensure the systemic survival through the meeting of integration tasks; and d) in the cultural domain the same is done by schools and churches. Each subsystem operates either in terms of directive or communicative media:

(a) money, in the economic domain

(b) votes, in the political domain

(c) normative influence/legitimacy, in the social domain, and

(d) value commitment, in the cultural domain.

The latter are natural indicators for the success and stability of a system and its constitutive (economic, political, social and cultural) components. Parsons’ structural-functional suppositions have been explored by regime theorists like Haas and system theorists like Luhmann (1975). However, most interestingly, they also seem to have had a significant influence on peace-building practices. Figure 1 shows that Parsons’ core assumptions mirror the main dimensions of the current peace-building discourse. Most, if not all, UN programs for action promoting a peaceful integration/inclusion of failed, rough or post-conflict states in the world community can be explained according to Parsons’ blueprint. The four main areas of the current UN sustainable peace-building strategy – sustainable development, good governance, rule of law, education – reiterate Parsons’ catalogue of functional necessities of an integrated system. The optimum systemic condition is in this instance a peaceful international order that reproduces itself through free markets and economic globalisation, democracy, universal norms like the adherence to human rights, and access to western education. These ideals have corresponding indicators. Poverty is quantified as an income under $1 a day, economic success is measured by a state’s share in the world market, and good governance means that leadership is also being made quantifiable through elections/the number of votes. Even social and cultural progress is operationalised in numeric terms, such as the number of people with internet access/literacy rates. Obviously, these indicators are focused on quantifiable outcomes that can legitimise ´result-orientated’ processes. They are modelled in analogy to quantifiable media of the economic and political domain (money and votes) since variables like normative influence/legitimacy and value commitment are difficult to operationalise, quantify and measure. The structural-functional parallels between UN programs for action and Parsons´ model show that in most current practices peace-building is equated with finding ways to guarantee the functioning of a system and not with a normative recovery of a society. In other words, current peace-building processes neglect core transformation processes in the field of social and cultural (perceptual) peace-building. They seek to establish a status quo – a particular predetermined functional outcome.

The German language philosopher Jürgen Habermas² outlined the first comprehensive critique of structural functionalism two decades ago. It sparked a theoretical debate on legitimatisation at the time that has remained largely unnoticed in other disciplines but that has nevertheless not lost its validity. It provides an interesting new angle on how processes of transformative peace-building could be reformed within a UN framework.

In his critique of Parsons, Habermas argues that, while Parsons’ model can successfully explain the ways in which functional order is achieved within a society, it can not describe systemic anomalies. For example, it overlooks the fact that cultural communicative processes are systematically disrupted by systemic forces. He speaks in this context of a ‘legitimisation crisis’ that characterises all modern societies. According to Habermas, communicative integration processes are the product of cultural Lebenswelt (‘life-world’) (Parsons’ social/cultural domain). Habermas argues that these processes are disrupted by the system (Parsons’ economic domain). He maintains that cultural integration processes are impoverished through the systemic interference of quantifiable media (e.g. money) that replace communicative media that are based on a shared normative understanding. The Lebenswelt is organised according to quantifiable systemic priorities (money/power). Habermas refers to this process as ‘colonialisation of the life-world’. Systemic priorities (money/power) alienate actors from their cultural and normative values and turn them into agents of the system. Actors become either clients of the welfare state, and global consumers with misconceived needs, or disillusioned anarchists who might turn against the system but without any normative reference point. In the long run, the growing normative anomy also threatens the survival of the system insofar as the latter loses its normative foundations and hence its integrative powers. The system has to compensate for this through an increased systemic and administrative effort in which it tries to appease its citizens through further concessions of a welfare state. This requires a renewed intervention into the Lebenswelt (and on the periphery if one thinks for example of the ongoing changes in immigration and asylum policies). As a result the public sphere – for Habermas, the mechanism through which agents of the Lebenswelt can engage in discursive will formation, that is to say can give expression to their real needs and influence policies – is again reduced and fragmented. Like this, the faith in the normative foundations of the system and hence its legitimacy is eroded. Culturally shared feelings of a common purpose and shared vision that have safeguarded processes of social and cultural integration are lost. This process results ultimately either in moral anomy and blind consumerism (in western societies) or extreme traditionalism and violence (on the periphery). Current phenomena like terrorism and weak states can be (among other things) explained through an inadequate integration of (local/national) social systems in the current world order. It can be argued that these counter-movements that challenge the merits of globalisation seek to assert and open lost public spheres that could legitimate and control the process. Habermas’ argument suggests that a stable international order (based on culturally authentic transformative processes) requires participation processes in all dimensions of the public sphere, that is to say on local, national and international levels.³ He shows that any international regime (including the UN) that fails to base its action on complementary normative understandings (at all levels) ultimately undermines itself and becomes a subject of disintegration.

III. Benchmarks and indicators within the UN system

Of course, much of what has been said so far is not necessarily new. Over the last few years there has been undoubtedly a new trend for cultural-political correctness in the conceptual discourse of the United Nations. For example, the term ‘local ownership’, which was first introduced by the United Nations Development Agency (UNDP) and then later reluctantly adopted by other international actors like the World Bank (WB), is one prominent example of a new awareness and acceptance of the cultural Other, the concession of limited modern wisdom and contextual constraints. This term stresses the importance of alternative normative agendas and the necessity of local participation and empowerment.

The growing acceptance of sustainable peace as a necessary precondition for sustainable development (best expressed in the Brahmini Report, the latest UNDP strategy papers and the Special Reports of the Secretary General on Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in Africa) demonstrates an expanding understanding of socio-economic (procedural) interdependence and the prerequisites for structural stability. It signifies a change in the setting of objectives.

Besides standard micro and macro-economic reforms and initiatives, other normative measurements – like the promotion of the rule of law, electoral assistance, reforms of the security sector, demilitarisation, re-education and resettlement of former combatants and the support of national reconciliation commissions – have been added to the catalogue of activities of the main agencies in the field. The latter are coordinated through the UNDP resident representative system, which also includes the UNDAF framework, which explicitly seeks to foster and facilitate communication processes between UN agencies in the field, local NGOs, INGOs and governments. Through the procedural inclusion of actors on all levels, processes of political participation and civil society-building have been strengthened. However, despite of all these efforts, it cannot be denied that this kind of sustainable peace-building still often follows the unreflected principles of a dominant political western discourse and consequently has not much in common with a culturally sensitive approach, which fosters perceptual peace-building from the ground up. Current buzz words in the UN discourse like ‘good’ governance still suggest that the ultimate task of any integrating practice lies in the facilitation of a structural assimilation of periphery states to western democracies.

In this comparative context, any alternative set of beliefs (reflecting different Lebenswelt/cultural knowledge) must appear suspect and/or inferior. ‘True’ is what is dictated by science and economic interest. ‘Just’ is what is considered as western law. These assumptions are generally not open for discussion. On the whole, there is an ongoing trend towards mistrust of cultural/Lebenswelt solutions that are pivotal for peace- building unless they are in one way or another ‘neutralised’. Adherence to traditional values is internationally misunderstood as an indicator for less developed (in structural terms) weaker states. And nearly every form of ideology is perceived as a potential terrorist threat. This is clearly as much a result of a realist discourse (‘norms are counterproductive to order’) as it is a product of neo-liberal thinking (‘democracy equals free trade and profit’) and a cultural bias (‘western democratic states are structurally better developed (and more peaceful) than non-western states’).

These narratives are structural equivalents to Parsons’ economic and political domains and Habermas’ notion of the system. They are major agents of colonialisation. They hide some of the predominant causes for disintegration on the periphery. They conceal for example the fact that conflicts do not necessarily result from the intra- systemic inability to cope with internal problems through the application of traditional, normative solutions (e.g. weak states) but from systematic misuse or a lost/limited understanding of the latter or external pressures of a neo-liberal world order and its (national/local) agents. There are many ways in which cultural/Lebenswelt knowledge can be distorted and people can be prevented from being themselves or are hindered from engaging in reinterpretation. Put differently, although UN agencies acknowledge the importance of local ownership they do not give sufficient attention to the function this notion has for integration processes like peace-building and sustainable development. As a result, UN agents perceive local ownership as an additional goal and not as an enabling communicative condition. As a consequence, the current terminology still stresses more the necessity for a cultural transformation of the non-western Other than the need for local reinterpretation and cultural adaptation of functional transformation processes.

This conceptual shortcoming is a consequence of a missing awareness and an absence of research into the normative/communicative/Lebenswelt components of peace-building processes. This weakness is best expressed in terms of another systemic UN buzz word – ‘result-orientated process’. This clearly specifies a functional/systemic outcome (‘strategic action’ in Habermas’ terminology). It does not describe a consensual/communicative-based process. The current peace-building and development discourse seems to ignore the fact that there is not only a necessity for an (economic, political and legal) sustainable order but also for a social and cultural sustainable (perceptual) peace. Current functionalist assumptions stress the ideal of systemic stability at the cost of cultural diversity. Neo-liberal values of globalisation and economic expansion subjugate communicative and moral needs further under strategic prerogatives of systemic survival and reinforce the well-known pathologies of modernity/colonialisation of the Lebenswelt that affect all societies but in particular the weaker states on the periphery. Despite all lip-service, most peace-building, development and integration efforts are still part of these narratives. This article has tried to show that an analysis of the components of transformative peace-building practices must lie beyond standard answers. It cannot solely consist of the meeting of functional needs. A successful peace-building process starts with a joint communicative assessment of functional and normative/perceptual needs (of all parties involved) and ends with a concrete assessment of the process in the framework of a society’s own categories and values and other good arguments which might be applicable, such as international law. Peace-building starts from the ground up. It is this form of dialogic participation that should ultimately serve as a cross-cultural indicator for good indigenous governance (and not for example the frequency of elections) and a functioning civil/international society.

So far peace-building and development strategies have not been based on a critical and creative application of cultural knowledge, leading always, in one way or another, to a duplication of existing (western) knowledge. This explains why practitioners have found it extremely difficult to include ideals of local ownership and community empowerment in their peace-building and development agendas. Ultimately, practitioners are faced with an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, their functional framework for action provides clear guidelines that encourage a replication of western political and economic structures. Their action is focused on systemic adaptation and functional/neo-liberal goal attainment. On the other hand, they are confronted by competing normative directives seeking to promote integration and latent pattern maintenance. These objectives have, strictly speaking, no reference point in their framework for action. A thorough understanding of the latter requires a cultural specific Lebenswelt perspective.

IV. A critical theory-based approach to transformative peace-building

In his formal-pragmatic reinterpretation of Parsons’ model, Habermas develops perceptual equivalents for Parsons’ structural-functional dimensions. He subdivides a Lebenswelt (cultural dimension) into three perceptual domains: science (objective world), politics/law (normative world) and art/aesthetics (subjective world). Habermas argues in his classic article on universal pragmatics that references to these different ‘worlds’ are inherent within speech and find their expression in individual/cultural validity claims of truth, justice and authenticity. These claims are either reflexive, that is to say open for revision and reason in a peaceful discourse, or distorted, that is to say closed for any reform and ideologically biased. Figure 2 sketches the dimension of a discourse of violence (distorted Lebenswelt) after a conflict and identifies its individual and systemic consequences. Distortions in the objective everyday usage of language reflect and reinforce mistaken beliefs within the theoretical knowledge accepted within a society. Distorted validity claims of truth find their expression in pseudo-scientific ideas on race, misperception of cultural history and individual/collective identities and unjustified feelings of superiority.

In this context, the potential for individual and collective learning and understanding (for example of objective root causes of conflict) degenerates. Distortions within the normative usage of language reflect and reinforce a loss of moral values and facilitate, such as dehumanisation of the enemy. Distorted validity claims of justice find their expression in cultures of impunity and discriminatory political and legal practices that legitimise amoral behaviour and impede reflexive moral judgement. This discursive legitimisation ultimately leads to a brutalisation of a collective consciousness – a state of a ‘fanaticised’ mind (Freire 1974, p.66ff) that can lead to ethnic persecution or even genocide. Distorted validity claims of authenticity result from the abovementioned factual and normative distortions. As a consequence of the lack of objective theoretical and sound moral-practical knowledge, actors lack the possibility of reflected self-critique. Categorical limitations within a discourse of violence influence moral judgement and an intentional use of language. It becomes more difficult for actors to be true to themselves and others. Furthermore, discourses of violence suppress any other forms of expression or intentional work that might encourage reflection or critical thought.

Empowerment, local ownership and participatory practice are all communicative terms that depend on the application of communicative reason. Following Habermas, a critical approach suggests the introduction of a Lebenswelt perspective to peace-building that respects cultural knowledge and diversity and includes it as an active part of its agenda. It argues for structural reform through communicative and moral learning instead of simple adaptation, and hopes to complement the present so-called structural-functional model. It further aims to highlight unjust and unequal power structures that the term ‘globalisation’ seeks to conceal, and offers an ideology critique.

Ann-Christin Raschdorf is currently serving as political affairs officer with the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Before this she served in the same function for the SRSG’s Office of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Previously she was research fellow of the International Security & Criminal Justice Programme at Trinity College and visiting fellow at the United Nations University (UNU/CRIS), where she has worked on regional indicators for peace and development. Before joining the United Nations, she worked for the European Union, the OSCE, the ICTR and NGOs in Palestine, Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. She is the author of ´Transcending Discourses on Violence: Peace-constitutive Practices of Truth, Justice and Authenticity in Rwanda: 1998-2002’ (forthcoming). Her main research areas are conflict studies and critical theory. Her other research interests include the United Nations system, second track diplomacy, regional studies (South-East Asia, Great Lakes, Middle East) and international law. She wrote her PhD thesis at the London School of Economics & Political Sciences, where she has also taught international political theory.

Notes

1. The presented approach is based on the universal-pragmatic insights of Jürgen Habermas. See Habermas 1976a, 1976b, 1976c, 1981 and 1983.

2. For Habermas’s critique of Parsons see Habermas 1981 (p.182ff, Band 2). For Habermas’ language philosophical approach see also Habermas 1976a, 1976b, 1976c and 1983.

3. David Held has further developed Habermas’ insights; in this context see Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton (1999).

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